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Reformers should 
review the loan-to- 
value guidelines for   
real estate lending, 
toughen them up   
where necessary and, 
most important, put   
the force of law   
behind them.
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by Limiting High-Risk Lending
by Jeffery W. Gunther
With financial turmoil apparently ebbing, all eyes are turning to re-
form. nearly everyone wants to avoid a repeat of today’s economic crisis and its 
wealth destruction, business closures, job losses, unsavory bailouts and govern-
ment deficits. But what should be done? With so many likely targets, it can be 
difficult to know where to aim financial reform. 
several realities make successful reform appear difficult, if not impos-
sible. First, the colossus of global financial linkages is so vast and complex that it 
seems incredible that policymakers could understand it, much less control it.  
second,  even  if  financial  turmoil’s  causes  were  identified  and  it   
became clear how to make the system less crisis prone, history shows that 
special interests would likely lobby the political process to stymie or water down 
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Third, even when the best possi-
ble reform is both clear and politically 
feasible, it might involve trade-offs, 
such as reduced economic dynamism 
and innovation, so that extreme finan-
cial volatility could be avoided only at 
substantial cost.
These challenges can’t be denied. 
Contemplating them, it may be tempt-
ing to conclude we’re left with two 
unsatisfactory alternatives—simply pre-
paring for the next crash or imposing 
large-scale restrictions on the financial 
sector to avoid an intolerable cycle. 
Meaningful reform may exist 
somewhere between these two 
extremes. In finding a middle ground, 
it’s important to acknowledge that the 
immediate source of today’s financial 
turmoil isn’t new or terribly complicat-
ed. The crisis is merely the latest mani-
festation of an old problem—credit 
booms fueled by loose lending tied to 
rising asset prices, followed by asset-
price busts that bring severe tightening 
of lending practices.  
With this in mind, limiting high-
risk lending during credit booms 
represents a key focus for reform. 
Fortunately, we know how constraint 
can be established for real estate 
lending—the loan category that domi-
nates most credit cycles. Specifically, a 
simple, effective reform would involve 
restricting a loan’s amount to no 
more than a specified percentage of 
the underlying real estate’s appraised 
value. 
A maximum loan-to-value ratio 
would create a cushion of borrower 
equity—the excess of collateral value 
above loan amount—available to lend-
ers in the event of default. In addition, 
borrowers would face the prospect 
of losing their equity, making them 
more likely to apply only for loans 
they were reasonably sure to repay. By 
promoting such conservatism, loan-to-
value regulation would guard against 
the speculative borrowing that leads to 
credit booms.  
Such a prudent lending rule 
might go a long way toward avoid-
ing a repeat of the current crisis and 
preventing another episode in which 
the government and central bank 
are put at risk because the financial 
industry requires extensive support. 
Commonsense safeguards to limit 
credit based on speculative fever may 
seem mundane compared to flashy 
reform topics like credit derivatives, 
too-big-to-fail and executive compen-
sation. Yet, they offer a straightforward 
way to bind the impulse toward unlim-
ited credit expansion that accompanies 
booming asset prices. 
Bubbles Past and Present
In today’s complex, globalized 
financial markets, it’s easy to forget 
that we’re working our way through 
an old-fashioned credit cycle, albeit 
a severe one. In a typical episode, 
financial institutions become more 
and more willing to lend, requiring 
lower and lower down payments. 
They’re willing to take on the added 
risk based on the spurious notion that 
collateral values—most notably real 
estate prices—will rise indefinitely. 
Easy credit further stimulates collateral 
values in a self-reinforcing process that 
leads to credit and asset-price bubbles. 
Eventually, they pop, real estate prices 
fall and borrowers default.  
The present troubles emerged to 
a large extent from the growing use of 
hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages with 
low “teaser” interest rates that would 
remain fixed for a few years before 
increasing, sometimes sharply. This 
type of mortgage instrument, heav-
ily relied on by subprime borrowers, 
seemed likely to perform well if hous-
ing prices continued to increase.
By the time interest rates reset 
to a higher level, resulting in higher 
monthly payments, rising house prices 
would have built equity in the home. 
Borrowers could refinance their debt 
prior to facing higher monthly pay-
ments, or perhaps they could sell the 
house for a profit. Housing prices 
surged for a number of years, and 
more and more of these risky mortgag-
es were originated, without too many 
apparent problems.  
Commonsense safeguards
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By historical standards, these 
mortgages were often a relatively high 
share of the purchase price, so bor-
rowers often entered these deals with 
only moderate down payments, or 
equity. Once housing prices flattened 
and began to fall, these mortgages 
encountered severe repayment difficul-
ties. Many borrowers defaulted, know-
ing they had little or negative equity 
and would be unable to qualify for 
refinancing when interest rates reset or 
collect any money by selling.
Hybrid adjustable-rate loans may 
have accounted for three-fourths of the 
subprime mortgages originated in 2005 
and 2006. Many recent defaults have 
been losing bets from dashed hopes of 
continually rising house prices.  
Once the downturn in subprime 
mortgages became severe, investors 
sought to reduce exposure to this asset 
class. Liquidity that had supported a 
wide variety of opaque investments 
suddenly dried up as investors, unsure 
of where subprime exposure actu-
ally existed, broadly withdrew funds. 
Financial panic magnified the current 
crisis—but the underlying cause was a 
credit boom turned to bust.   
In its broad features, today’s finan-
cial crisis fits the historical pattern of 
excesses in real estate finance followed 
by declining property prices and ris-
ing loan defaults. The U.S. banking 
crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
followed a real estate boom and easy 
credit policies for commercial real 
estate loans. The same sort of real 
estate and credit cycle played out in 
the severe financial problems engulfing 
Japan throughout the 1990s and affect-
ing several other East Asian countries 
in the latter part of the decade.   
The lingering question is why 
credit booms, including this latest one, 
are allowed to go so far, with seem-
ingly no mechanism to limit activ-
ity to more sustainable levels. One 
explanation, popular in policy and 
regulatory circles, stresses the difficulty 
of accurately identifying asset price 
bubbles—even after the fact, much 
less at the time. Efforts to pop or miti-
gate what might be a bubble could be 
misguided.  
This view, however, is overly nar-
row. While the economic legitimacy 
of asset price surges can be difficult to 
assess, we can identify, based on lend-
ing practices, the degree to which the 
loans made during a credit boom are 
predicated on continued asset price 
increases. During the latest episode, it 
was duly noted that many mortgage 
loans made sense only if housing 
prices continued to rise. The question 
remains then—why was nothing done 
to limit the buildup in high-risk loans?
Loan-to-Value Guidelines  
Coming out of the banking cri-
sis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Congress was eager to curtail high-risk 
commercial real estate lending, a prima-
ry culprit. Reflecting this goal, early ver-
sions of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
(FDICIA) specified upper limits on the 
loan-to-value of real estate loans.  
By the time the legislation reached 
its final form, however, the loan-to-
value limits had disappeared. Congress 
merely assigned federal regulators the 
task of establishing standards for real 
estate lending. The resulting proposed 
regulation would have established 
maximum loan-to-value ratios for vari-
ous types of real estate lending.
Bankers claimed the proposed 
regulation would have been costly, 
inflexible, misdirected and antigrowth. 
Regulators responded much like 
Congress did before them, reversing 
course and deciding against imposing 
the regulation on loan-to-value limits. 
Instead, they opted for loan-to-value 
guidelines that banks should follow 
when formulating their internal real 
estate lending policies. These guide-
lines incorporated a liberalized version 
of the originally proposed loan-to-val-
ue regulation, with appreciably lower 
equity requirements for loans. 
The guidelines remain in effect 
today, recommending loan-to-value 
limits for various categories of real 
estate lending, such as construction or 
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improved property. The guidelines, for 
example, call for credit enhancement 
in the form of mortgage insurance or 
extra collateral on mortgages on own-
er-occupied, one- to four-family resi-
dential property with a loan-to-value of 
90 percent or higher at origination.
The guidelines have substantial 
flexibility, providing leeway for lend-
ing at loan-to-value ratios that exceed 
the specified maximums. However, the 
size of a bank’s capital base limits the 
aggregate amount of such high loan-
to-value lending.
For several reasons, relatively 
weak loan-to-value guidelines failed 
to prevent a crisis centered on home 
mortgage lending. First, enforcement 
most likely hasn’t been as strict as it 
would have been for more binding 
regulation or law. Second, the 90 per-
cent loan-to-value rule for home mort-
gages is fairly liberal, with historical 
precedent closer to 80 percent. 
Third, regulators decided against 
applying the loan-to-value guidelines 
to newly originated loans that were 
promptly sold, with the lender retain-
ing no formal liability for losses. This 
exclusion meant the guidelines didn’t 
cover many of the home mortgages 
that have proven so problematic in 
recent years. Lenders originated the 
loans with the intent to quickly sell 
them into the securitization process, 
which issues bonds based on the 
income streams expected from loan 
pools.
Finally, the guidelines generally 
apply to insured banks and thrifts but 
not to other entities involved in home 
mortgage origination, such as nonbank 
subsidiaries of bank holding compa-
nies and independent mortgage com-
panies. These lightly regulated institu-
tions originated many of the home 
mortgages that have run into trouble, 
highlighting a critical lack of coverage 
by the loan-to-value guidelines.
The earlier attempt at reducing 
high-risk lending through loan-to-value 
guidelines provides a cautionary tale. 
The reform process began with a sense 
of urgency, when lawmakers, stung by 
a banking crisis, prepared to set limits 
on the aggressiveness of real estate 
lending. But the loan-to-value rules 
were downgraded first to proposed 
regulation and finally to supervisory 
guidelines much looser than originally 
contemplated.  
Making It Work
There’s no shortage of possible 
explanations for the loose lending 
practices that caused the recent crisis. 
We can cite regulations and govern-
ment initiatives that sought to promote 
homeownership by easing access to 
mortgage credit. Or we can point a fin-
ger at deregulatory policies that some 
say encouraged the reckless behavior 
witnessed in financial markets. 
Reform could get bogged down 
in debate over the causes of high-risk 
lending. Fortunately, enforcement of 
clear and specific rules that promote 
systemwide constraint on borrower 
leverage in real estate loans could miti-
gate the credit booms and busts, no 
matter their source.
To move forward, reformers 
should review the loan-to-value guide-
lines for real estate lending, toughen 
them up where necessary and, most 
important, put the force of law behind 
them—as contemplated by the early 
drafts of FDICIA. 
Legislation specifying a loan-to-
value framework would provide well-
defined rules and signal strong political 
support. This is important to encour-
age strict enforcement and preclude 
tampering. Once positive momentum 
returns to real estate markets, bor-
rowers surely will seek greater lever-
age, and lenders, eyeing rich returns, 
may want to oblige them. Under such 
temptations, mere guidelines could be 
violated or watered down. In contrast, 
violating the law would be a more 
serious matter, and changing the legis-
lation would require Congress to act.  
Effective loan-to-value legislation 
should apply consistently to all major 
types of real estate lenders, includ-
ing mortgage companies, and to all 
or most of the real estate credit they 
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extend, including loans originated for 
sale into the securitization process. 
Any gaps or loopholes in the loan-to-
value limits would only invite mischief.   
Consistent application of a loan-
to-value framework over most real 
estate credit shouldn’t be too costly 
or burdensome in this digital age. It 
seems fair and reasonable to expect 
the financial system to generate the 
accurate and timely real estate apprais-
als and recording systems necessary 
for consistent control of loan-to-value 
ratios at the point of origination. This 
expectation can be enforced through 
supervisory reviews and actions, 
backed by legislation.
Would such legislation have 
prevented, or at least dampened, the 
recent crisis? Most likely. By some esti-
mates, home mortgages with loan-to-
value above 90 percent accounted for 
35 percent to 40 percent of subprime 
originations in 2005 and 2006. Many 
of these high loan-to-value subprime 
mortgages didn’t meet the guidelines’ 
requirement for mortgage insurance 
or extra collateral. The more stringent 
80 percent criterion may have been 
violated an astounding 60 percent of 
the time.  
Loan-to-value reform would 
complement policy actions already 
taken in mortgage regulation. A recent 
amendment to Regulation Z, or Truth 
in Lending, will prohibit lenders from 
extending certain types of home mort-
gage loans without due consideration 
of borrowers’ ability to repay based 
on income and other assets. While 
primarily a consumer protection issue, 
this amendment may also help prevent 
another systemic buildup of high-risk 
mortgages.  
The Regulation Z amendment was 
a positive step, but an appropriately 
conservative loan-to-value framework 
would do even more to promote safe 
and sound mortgage lending. In addi-
tion, the framework would offer great-
er protection against excessive risk-
taking in real estate lending generally, 
without being limited to just certain 
types of home mortgage loans.
Room for Rules
We can get some idea of the 
benefits of moving from guidelines to 
more tightly enforced rules through 
a brief review of another regulatory 
effort to constrain or otherwise man-
age high-risk lending practices.
By late 2006, rising commercial 
real estate (CRE) exposures across the 
banking industry had caused substan-
tial concern among supervisors—not 
surprising, given the prominent role of 
CRE lending in prior crises. Regulators 
issued guidance aimed at reinforcing 
sound risk management practices and 
appropriate levels of capital for banks 
with high concentrations of CRE loans 
on their balance sheets.
The guidance specified thresholds 
for determining when exposure to CRE 
lending warranted especially strong 
risk management practices. Beyond the 
thresholds for CRE lending in general, 
the guidance singled out loans for 
construction and land development, 
directing heightened supervisory atten-
tion to banks with construction loans 
in excess of capital.
The CRE guidance may have 
had some effect in cooling construc-
tion lending activity and raising 
awareness regarding the need for 
risk management, but it also has 
had some shortcomings. First, the 
initiative’s introduction wasn’t timely 
because construction loan expo-
sures had already been increasing 
for many years. At the beginning of 
2001, about one in 10 banks already 
exceeded the threshold specified six 
years later for construction lending. 
By year-end 2006, more than a fourth 
of commercial banks had construc-
tion loans in excess of capital.  
Second, restricting construction 
loan exposures hasn’t been a stated 
goal, and such lending continued to 
rise despite the guidance. It didn’t 
decline relative to capital until after the 
real estate market had turned down—
and then only slightly. At year-end 
2008, more than a fourth of banks still 
exceeded the guidance, the same as 
two years earlier.  
Consistent application 
of a loan-to-value 
framework over most 
real estate credit 
shouldn’t be too costly 
or burdensome in this 
digital age.   EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas 6   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter
Third, once the credit bust 
occurred, delinquency rates for con-
struction loans rose most at banks the 
guidance identified as posing a greater 
risk—those with the highest concen-
trations of construction loans. At the 
end of the first quarter of this year, 
the average nonperforming rate on 
construction loans for banks exceed-
ing the guidance was 12.71 percent, 
compared with 7.71 percent for active 
construction lenders operating within 
the guidance. 
The high nonperformance rates 
for construction loans at banks flagged 
by the guidance suggest lending policy 
was especially aggressive and risky at 
these institutions, despite the height-
ened supervisory attention on them.   
Moreover, souring construction 
loans have contributed to bank fail-
ures during the downturn. For the 
50 or so commercial banks that have 
failed since the start of 2007, near 
the beginning of the downturn, the 
average ratio of construction loans to 
capital at that time was 280 percent, 
well above the 100 percent threshold 
specified by the CRE guidance. The 
average ratio for surviving banks was 
75 percent. 
Guidance may be effective in 
some instances, but experience with 
construction loans points to the need 
for hard-and-fast rules designed to 
preclude, rather than manage, the most 
extreme risk exposures. 
What about Other Reforms?
Some widely discussed reform 
proposals focus on requiring lenders to 
keep “skin in the game” and address-
ing the too-big-to-fail dilemma. A 
quick look at them—and their possible 
limitations—highlights the safety and 
soundness benefits of adding a consis-
tently applied and rigorously enforced 
loan-to-value framework. 
During the credit boom, mortgage 
companies sold loans into the securiti-
zation process, allowing them to earn 
fees without remaining on the hook 
for loan performance. With their liabil-
ity limited, originators may have had 
less incentive to maintain appropriately 
conservative lending policies.
A reform to counteract this prob-
lem could involve a requirement that 
mortgage originators always have skin 
in the game, retaining significant expo-
sure to securitized loans. Knowing 
they would share in any subsequent 
losses, originators should be less likely 
to venture into high-risk lending.
While this proposal has merit, 
it doesn’t address high-risk banking 
strategies. Banks were typically at the 
center of the securitization process 
and put their own money at risk. They 
sometimes did their own originating 
and sometimes held financial stakes in 
the companies that sold the mortgages 
into the securities markets. 
At times, banks retained credit 
risk by allowing investors to return 
problem mortgages from the mortgage 
pools backing securities. They also 
would sometimes support senior lev-
els of the mortgage-backed securities 
by taking more subordinate positions, 
a commitment to bear the burden of 
early defaults. Moreover, banks often 
simply invested in the securities they 
or other banks had created. 
Because of these practices, much 
of the credit risk that securitization 
presumably had shifted to investors 
actually stayed in the banking system. 
Since banks already have had skin in 
the game, the real opportunity for this 
type of reform may lie not with lend-
ers but with borrowers. It would give 
them skin in the game.
Requiring all lenders to adhere 
to more prudent loan-to-value limits 
would lead borrowers to take higher 
stakes in real estate purchases and 
projects. The entire financial system 
then could operate more soundly and 
safely, given the cushion of borrower 
equity embedded in the real estate col-
lateral supporting the loans. 
Too-big-to-fail is shorthand for the 
potential dangers to the economy from 
the loss of very large and interconnect-
ed financial institutions. Massive gov-
ernment assistance and central bank 
support applied to some big, troubled 
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banks have bestowed upon them a 
degree of resilience beyond their own 
making, possibly tilting the competitive 
balance in their favor. 
The extensive protections have 
blunted the full force that market disci-
pline might have otherwise exerted in 
reshaping the competitive landscape. 
The existence of this safety net may 
also have propelled heightened risk-
taking at large banks. 
Where market forces are muted, 
it’s left to lawmakers and regulators to 
exert the disciplining force needed to 
restrain excesses and promote prudent 
lending. Financial institutions likely 
to be deemed too big to fail need 
heightened regulatory attention and 
safeguards. A loan-to-value framework 
could prove a vital component of such 
an effort. 
Beyond too-big-to-fail, poten-
tial for excess risk-taking arises from 
deposit insurance and other features 
of the federal safety net provided to 
banks of all sizes. Comprehensive 
loan-to-value legislation, applied con-
sistently across all types of lenders, 
could play an important role in reduc-
ing these perverse incentives.
Funding the Economy 
Any restrictions on profit-generat-
ing activities are likely to be unpopular 
among lenders, even if the profits are 
only transitory. This sentiment may 
render lawmakers and, by extension, 
regulators reluctant to restrict high-risk 
lending, particularly when financial cri-
ses aren’t in the headlines.
Almost two decades ago, bankers 
claimed the proposed loan-to-value 
regulation would crimp the supply of 
credit and reduce economic growth. 
Opponents of tougher regulation may 
make the same case today, but the 
current crisis has generated wide-
spread agreement that a sustainable 
economic expansion is far superior to 
hyper-growth fueled by high levels of 
speculative credit. 
Even if policymakers decide to 
rule out only the very loosest and 
most aggressive lending practices, this 
restriction would be more intrusive 
for some financial institutions than 
past regulations. However, this seems 
a small price to pay for keeping the 
credit cycle below the bubble- and 
crisis-producing levels. 
The loan-to-value framework 
wouldn’t prevent risk-taking or dis-
place lenders’ judgment and business 
decisions. Rather, it would help limit 
leverage among borrowers and restrict 
high-risk real estate lending to levels 
commensurate with the existing capi-
tal base of credit providers. By doing 
so, it would help maintain the stable 
source of funds necessary to finance 
economic activity.
Real estate and credit cycles 
wouldn’t be eliminated under the 
loan-to-value framework. As real 
estate appraisals rise in an economic 
upswing, so too would allowable loan 
amounts, implying a naturally occur-
ring cycle. Extreme cycles, fueled by 
high-risk lending, are what the frame-
work would work against. 
The loan-to-value framework 
could be a vital component of new 
and stronger rules of the road for the 
financial industry. Policymakers might 
want to capitalize on how pivotal a 
consistently applied lending policy 
could be.  
Loose credit and large exposures 
to high-risk lending need not be 
viewed as acceptable banking strate-
gies. Given the government support 
provided to financial institutions, it 
would seem fair and reasonable to 
restrict the extreme forms of such 
practices, while still allowing a wide 
spectrum of business strategies and 
directions from which lenders could 
choose.
Gunther is an assistant vice president in the 
Financial Industry Studies Department of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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